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The collective good variously referred to as security, order, protection of
property rights, or simply, protection, is a precondition for the provision of
ordinary infrastructural public goods and generally for facilitating trade and
economic development. Historically, it has also been the rst type of good
provided by states and is often considered the quintessential and dening
attribute of the state.1
What sets protection apart, though, and its variations from other col-
lective goods is the following characteristic: The inputs that are used for its
production soldiers and policemen, swords and guns contain the seeds
for the goods own destruction. Policemen and soldiers, by virtue of their
positions, could extract even more than the robbers and bandits they are
supposed to guard against. Similarly, rulers who provide protection against
internal and external threats can use their power of extraction at an even
grander scale. Army generals and colonels, ostensibly at the service of demo-
cratic governments, can, and regularly do, topple such governments. Clearly
protection is not an ordinary good.
In this paper we argue that taking into account such peculiarities in the
provision of protection leads to the understanding of two important tenden-
cies, both in history and in the present. First, competition for the provision
of protection often takes a very di¤erent form than the one we are accus-
tomed to in economics: private providers of protection, instead of competing
on the price of their service, typically compete with their means of violence
over turf. Under such predatory competition, more competition leads to
worse outcomes. Second, our approach helps understand the wide preva-
lence of autocracy, instead of self-governance, in the provision of protection
and more generally in the organization of governance.
The type of competition usually examined within economics is one in
which di¤erent jurisdictions attempt to attract mobile subjects through
lower taxation, other privileges, and the provision of public goods. Whereas
this type of competition is common nowadays and some economic historians
(e.g., North and Thomas, 1973) have argued for its importance in the rise
of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form that has existed in
the past or the sole form of competition that is taking place today. From
Ancient Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica, or Medieval Europe,
serfs were tied to the land and free peasants had few outside options, with
rulers coming and going but without any change in their incentives for pro-
duction. Emperors, kings, and princes were ghting for territory and the
1 In the sense, following Webers denition, that the provider of protection also has the
monopoly in the legitimate use of force (Weber, 1978). Of course, in practice no actual
state has a monopoly in the use of force. For example, the Russian Federal government
exerts little control on some republics, maas, or o¢ cials within its territory. Similarly, but
less dramatically, US authorities exert little control in some American inner cities. Webers
usage of the term legitimatewas likely meant to overcome this problem, although other
questions emerge about the meaning of the term, especially for economists.
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rents that come with it just as, in more recent times, maosi and warlords
ght for turf and their accompanying protection rents. Under such condi-
tions, the tribute or protection money paid depends on the relative ability
of each side in the use of force. Promising a lower tribute on the part of a
provider of protection is not credible unless it reects that relative power of
the two sides, the ruler and his agents on one side and the ordinary producer
usually on the other.
In analyzing the behavior of for-prot providers of protection (or, states)
we examine two market structures or regimes: the form of monopolistic
competition that we have just described as well as monopoly. The most
likely stable outcome that emerges endogenously is to have multiple for-
prot states. Each state hires guards to protect its sequestered peasants
from bandits, hires warriors to protect its borders from the other states, and
receives income from tribute extracted from its peasant subjects. Moreover,
under the regime with competing predatory states, under the conditions
we examine total output can even be lower than without a state; all the
savings accruing from the provision of internal protection are dissipated in
ghting over the same rents created by those savings, whereas states can
extract more than simple bandits. Thus, as far as the market for protection
is concerned, and as another manifestation of the peculiar character of the
provision of protection, competition is not a good thing.
Another set of market structures we examine involve self-governing groups
of producers, with and without competition from for-prot states. The
consensually organized, self-governing state could survive in the absence of
predators, and although collective security would be underprovided and the
state would be small in size, the welfare of peasants and bandits would
be highest under such a market structure. In the presence of competing
predators, however, we have found no long-run equilibrium in which a self-
governing state would be viable. Because self-governing states face the free-
rider problem, they have to be small. Being small in the presence of larger
predators though, necessitates too much expenditure per person on external
as well as internal security, leaving little room for production with a resul-
tant welfare lower than even the subjects of a predator would enjoy. Thus,
this nding helps understand the prevalence of autocracy.
The di¢ culty of establishing democracy and self-governance and the
prevalence of autocracy is apparent from many recent experiences as well
as more distant ones. From Indonesia to Africa, most post-colonial states
have experienced coups and dictatorships to a much greater degree than
democratic governance. Earlier, during the nineteenth century the rst post-
colonial states of Latin America have had similar fates. Our ndings are also
very relevant to the almost complete absence of self-governance during the
time between the agricultural revolution and two centuries ago (see, e.g.,
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Finer, 1997, or Mann, 1986).2 Our approach is most relevant for this time
period given that our model does not allow for the complex institutional
web of modern mass representative democracy.3
Our approach is still helpful though in understanding what occurs in
places in which the reach of the modern state is weak. That includes many
failedstates as well as the areas within modern states with power vacuums
that allow warlords, gangs, and maas to develop. As Gambetta (1993)
argues the primary commodity sold by the Sicilian maa is protection (for
modeling dedicated to the activities of maas and gangs see Grossman,
1995, Polo, 1995, Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1995, and other contributions
in Fiorentini and Peltzman, 1995, Konrad and Skaperdas,1997,1998).We tell
a story with peasants and bandits which also applies to interactions among
shopkeepers and robbers in Moscow, Los Angeles, or Lagos. In the latter
case gangs and maas come in to ll the gap vacated by the modern state,
supplanting it and creating a near-monopoly of force in their area. We help
understand why genuine community policing is di¢ cult and why gangs arise
in conditions with a power vacuum.
Compared to other work that has viewed the state as maximizing its
revenue while providing a public good (Brennan and Buchanan, 1977,1978;
Engineer, 1989; Findlay, 1990; Olson, 1991; Grossman and Noh, 1994; Mar-
couiller and Young, 1995; McGuire and Olson, 1996, Moselle and Polak,
2001), we take account of the aforementioned peculiar status of protection
relative to other public goods. We also allow for the distribution of output,
including taxation by the state, to depend explicitly on the relative ability
of a¤ected parties to use force. Thus taxation has a direct resource cost,
whereas the cost of taxation in the existing literature is indirect, as dead-
weight loss or reduction in market activities. More importantly, in contrast
to all this work which supposes a single Leviathan monopolistic state, we al-
low for di¤erent types for-prot and self-governing and the combinations
2Possible exceptions include city-states in early Mesopotamia, Ancient Greece, and late
Medieval Italy. Of course, all of these are subject to many qualications as the democratic
franchise did not include slaves, women, and often most of the rest of the male population
because of property qualications.
3We should mention two analytically distinct but complementary reasons to the one
we examine in this paper for the di¢ culties of self-governances survival. First, coordina-
tion problems inherent in democratic decision-making might provide an advantage to the
hierachical decision-making that usually prevails in the for-prot provision of protection.
The formal incorporation of this reason in our model would not be di¢ cult and would
reinforce our results. In fact, representative democracy can be thought of as an attempt
to get around the coordination problems of democracy. However, inherent in representa-
tive democracy is the second reason that limits self-governance, the so-called iron law of
oligarchrst identied by Michels (1962): the tendency of representative insitutions and
organizations to be hijacked by their elected representatives and o¢ cers, primarily due to
the informational asymmetry that develops between representatives and the represented.
It would be di¢ cult to incorporate this reason in our modeling, although it is clearly an
important one that complements our own.
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of market structures that become then possible. Usher (1989) is probably
closest to this paper; but while we are interested primarily in contrasting
the di¤erent types of states that can arise, Ushers main interest is in the
alternation between despotism and anarchy. 4
Because of the di¤erent market structures of di¤erent complexities that
we examine, we start with the simplest one, anarchy, and gradually build
to the more complex ones while trying to maintain comparisons with those
analyzed earlier.
I. Peasants and Bandits in Anarchy
We begin with the simplest setting in which there is an absence of collec-
tive organizations. Individuals out of a population N sort themselves among
peasant farmers and bandits where the latter make a living by preying on
the peasants. A similar story could be told for an anarchic urban setting by
having instead of peasants and bandits workers and robbers as the two
possible occupations. Each peasant has one unit of a resource that he can
distribute between work and self-protection the higher is the level of self-
protection, the lower is the amount of work and the lower is the output that
can be produced. Denoting this self-protection activity by x, the peasant
can keep a share p(x) of output away from bandits, where p(x) is increasing
in x, p(x) 2 [0; 1]; p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. Thus the payo¤ of a peasant is as
follows:
Up = p(x)(1  x) (1)
Each peasant chooses a level of self-protection x so as to maximize this
payo¤ in (1). We suppose a unique such level, denoted by x. For the
remainder of this paper we also denote the payo¤ associated with x by Up .
The bandits roam the countryside looking for peasants to prey upon.
Let Np denote the number of peasants and let Nb represent the number of
bandits. The bandits payo¤ is as follows:
Ub = [1  p(x)](1  x)Np
Nb
(2)
That is, bandits extract 1 p(x) of output from each peasant who has not
been previously robbed and the more peasants there are relative to bandits,
the better it is for a bandit.5
4Another related area of research from economics is on the determinants of the size
of states (Friedman, 1977, Wittman, 1991, Artzrouni and Komlos, 1996, Findlay, 1996).
Our approach adds to this literature by deriving the determinants of size, as well as type,
from an explicit optimizing model (Findlay also does this for a single state, an empire).
5We could obviously allow for a peasant to be robbed more than once by bandits, but
such an assumption would unnecessarily complicate our model, especially in the later sec-
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Given that a peasants payo¤ is uniquely determined by the choice of
x (and equals Up ), we are interested in an equilibrium state whereby the
numbers of bandits and peasants adjust until a bandits payo¤ equals that
of a peasant. Formally, an anarchic equilibrium is a number of peasants Np ,
a number of bandits Nb , and a bandits payo¤ U

b such that N

p +N

b = N
and Ub = U

p . In equilibrium the numbers of peasants and bandits are then
given by:
Np = p(x
)N and Nb = [1  p(x)]N (3)
The easier is to defend output from bandits, as captured by the properties
of the function p() and the amount of self-protection induced, the more
peasants there are relative to bandits. Total output, which we will use in
welfare comparisons with collective forms of the organization of protection
that we will examine later, equals:
Np (1  x) = p(x)(1  x)N (4)
Compared to the Nirvanacondition without banditry, in which total
output would equal N , the lower output under anarchy has two sources: (i)
The fact that bandits do not contribute anything to production [the associ-
ated welfare loss equals [1   p(x)]N ] and (ii) those who become peasants
have to divert a fraction of their resources toward self-protection [the asso-
ciate welfare loss is p(x)xN ].6
II. Collective Protection
In addition to each peasant taking self-protection measures against ban-
dits privately, several peasants, a village, or a district could take protection
measures collectively. Such measures can include simple warning systems
about the presence of bandits in the area, the formation of a militia that
becomes active when there is a threat, the building of rudimentary forti-
cations to protect crops or other property, or the employment of full-time
guards and policemen. We abstract from the particular forms that collec-
tive protection takes and we simply suppose that collective protection can be
provided more e¢ ciently than self-protection. Letting z 2 [0; 1] denote the
tions. We should mention that the function p(x) could take a probabilistic interpretation,
denoting the probability of the peasant prevailing in a conictual encounter with a bandit.
(Such a function can be justied axiomatically or in other ways as in Hirshleifer (1989),
Skaperdas (1996), or Clark and Riis (1998).) Given the risk neutrality of the two types
of agents in (1) and (2), a peasant and bandit would be indi¤erent between such conict
and dividing output with a share p(x) going to the peasant and the remainder going to
the bandit.
6With p(x) = x, we have x = 1=2, there are as many bandits as peasants and total
output is 1=4 of potential output.
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groups average per peasant expenditure on collective protection consisting
of k peasants, the e¤ective expenditure on collective protection (equivalent
to expenditures on self-protection) received by each peasant is a function
f(z) with the following properties:
f(0) = 0; f(z) > z for all z 2 (0; 1); k  k for some k > 1; f() is concave,
twice di¤erentiable, except possibly at one point, and its inverse exists
(5)
The share of own output retained by a peasant who has contributed xi
to collective protection is p(xi + f(z)),7 where z =
Pk
j=1
zj
k and zj is the
contribution of peasant j in the collective protection of the group. The key
property in (5) is f(z) > z, for it implies that if each peasant in a group
were to contribute z to collective protection, instead of contributing it to
self-protection, he or she would receive a higher level e¤ective protection
overall. To have this type of protection truly collective, we require that the
number of peasants in a group is at least as high as the minimum size k:
To gain intuition about the e¤ects of the collective protection technology
and to facilitate comparisons with the non-cooperative choice we examine
later, we briey consider optimal choices of protection that maximize a wel-
fare objective that takes the size (k) and composition of a group of peasants
as given. The objective is to choose x0is and z
0
is (i = 1; :::; k) so as to maxi-
mize the sum of the payo¤s of the peasants belonging to the group:
kX
i=1
Upi =
kX
i=1
p(xi + f(z))(1  xi   zi) where z =
kX
j=1
zj
k
(6)
Given that xi and zi have the same cost to a peasant but the average
protection is higher with collective protection, we might expect that opti-
mal protection should involve collective protection only. This is not the case,
however, since given the concavity of f() the marginal return of collective
protection could fall below the return to self-protection (which, given our
specication, equals unity). Thus, the optimal choice involves choosing col-
lective protection up to a certain point where f 0(z)  1:When f 0(z) > 1, no
self-protection is undertaken, whereas with f 0(z) = 1 some self-protection
could be undertaken. Whether or not some self-protection is optimal de-
pends on the functional form.
Choosing the right levels of collective and private protection would re-
quire a benevolent agent who would also have the power to impose such
choices. This would amount to e¤ectively assuming away the problem we
7Similar functions that allow for both public and private protection or precautionary
activities have been used in the law and crime literature (see, eg, Ben-Shar and Alon,
1995, or Hylton, 1996).
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set out to examine. Thus, instead our task in the remainder it to explore
di¤erent alternatives  di¤erent industrial organizations of protection 
that could emerge from anarchy that utilize the more e¢ cient collective
protection technology.
III. Self-governance
One way of utilizing the higher e¢ ciency of collective protection is for
peasants to form a self-governing community and voluntarily contribute to
collective protection, through a part-time peasantsmilitia, through the con-
struction of fortications, or other means.
Consider a group of k ( k) peasants, with the k initially given, who
voluntarily choose between production, contributions to collective protec-
tion, and self-protection. That is, each peasant i belonging to the group
chooses xi and zi (and, therefore, production which equals 1  xi  zi) so as
to maximize his payo¤ as given by
Upi = p(xi + f(z))(1  xi   zi) where z =
kX
j=1
zj
k
(7)
These choices are made simultaneously by all peasants in the group so
that they form a Nash equilibrium. To analyze such equilibria, rst consider
peasant is incentives to choose xi and zi as indicated in the following partial
derivatives:
@Upi
@xi
= p0(xi + f(z))(1  xi   zi)  p(xi + f(z)) (8)
@Upi
@zi
= p0(xi + f(z))(1  xi   zi)f
0(z)
k
  p(xi + f(z)): (9)
The rst term of each equation represents the marginal private benet of
each protection activity, whereas the second term represents its marginal
cost. Note how the marginal private benet of contributing to collective
protection in (9) is just 1=k of the value of its marginal social benet. By
comparing (8) to (9), it can be seen that a peasants marginal benet of
increase in xi exceeds his of her marginal benet of an increase in zi if
and only if f 0(z) > k. A more e¢ cient collective protection and a smaller
group size increase the incentives for individual contributions to collective
protection. In this setting three di¤erent types of equilibrium can occur:
(a) zi = 0; xi = x for all i (quasi-anarchy with only private protection).
(b) zi = z^ for some z^ > 0; xi = 0 for all i (only collective protection
used).
(c) zi = z^ for some z^ > 0; xi = x^ for some x^ > 0 (both types of
protection used).
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Using standard techniques, the following properties can be shown to
hold (for proofs please see a Supplementary Appendix that is available on
request):
Property (i): Equilibrium collective protection is non-increasing in group
size k and strictly decreasing in k for type (c) and for type (b) provided
p(f(z^)) < 1:
Property (ii): Equilibrium self-protection is constant with respect to
group size for types (a) and (b) and strictly decreasing for type (c).
Property (iii): The level of protection (i.e., the share retained by each
peasant) is at least as high as under anarchy; it is strictly higher for type
(c) and for type (b) if p(f(z^)) < 1:
Property (iv): Individual welfare is non-increasing in group size. It is
always constant for type (a) and it is always strictly decreasing for type (c)
and for type (b) if p(f(z^)) < 1:
Property (v) of the mixed type (c) equilibrium implies that, if we were
to allow for an endogenous determination of group size, the size that would
most likely emerge is the minimal one for which collective protection is
feasible (i.e., for k). We now introduce the possibility of the endogenous
determination of groups.
A self-governing equilibrium is a number of peasants N^p, a number of
peasant groups n^p, and a number of bandits N^b such that:
(I) Each peasant belongs to a group, chooses self-protection and collec-
tive protection strategically, and has no incentive to join another group or
become a bandit;
(II) Each bandit does not have an incentive to join a peasant group;
(III) N^p + N^b = N:
Part (I) of the denition implies that in a self-governing equilibrium peas-
ants have equal payo¤s across groups and, therefore, all groups must have
the same size. Moreover, group size must equal k, since otherwise there
would be an incentive for some peasants to form a smaller group as, by
property (iv), have higher payo¤s. Part (II) implies that the payo¤ of ban-
dits must equal that of peasants, provided security is less than complete and
there is a positive number of bandits in such an equilibrium. The following
Proposition summarizes the main attributes of self-governing equilibria.
Proposition 1 Consider a type (b) equilibrium with p(f(z^)) < 1 or a type
(c) equilibrium. Such an equilibrium has the following properties: (i) Each
group is of minimum size k; (ii) the number of peasants (N^p) is higher than
the number of peasants under anarchy (Np ) and the number of bandits (N^b)
is lower than the number of bandits under anarchy (Np ); (iii) the welfare of
peasants belonging to a group and the welfare of bandits is higher than that
under anarchy.
Since the minimal scale for collective protection against bandits, k, can
be considered small the self-governing groups that will form will be of small
9
size. We should note that self-governance involves considerable coordination
and decision costs which would also favor small size and, in combination with
the free-rider problem, could render self-governance more problematic than
it appears thus far.
IV. Protection for Prot
Instead of having peasants voluntarily provide a portion of their time for
collective protection, an entrepreneur Leviathan, the chief, local lord, or
Maa don could hire full-time guards to protect peasants against bandits
in return for tribute. His objective would be to maximize the di¤erence
between his receipts from tribute minus his costs. Receipts from tribute are
likely to be higher the better is the level of protection and the larger is the
number of peasants. Thus, it appears that as far as collective protection is
concerned an entrepreneur could have incentives to provide it for prot. The
catch is of course what the peasants could get out of this, for the machinery
protection against bandits can double as that of extortion against peasants.
IV.A Monopoly protection by Leviathan
We begin with the simpler form of market structure, whereby protection
is provided monopolistically by Leviathan. Monopoly is also virtually the
only form of market structure that has been studied in other work, starting
with Brennan and Buchanan (1977), on the prot-maximizing state and
therefore we can make appropriate comparisons more easily.
Leviathan can utilize the same collective protection technology intro-
duced in section 3. He hires guards to protect peasants against bandits but
also, at least indirectly, to extract tribute from the same peasants. Letting
Ng denote the number of guards, f(
Ng
Np
) represent the units of collective
protection received by each peasant.8 The extraction of tribute is also fa-
cilitated by an elite corps, the praetorians, who also monitor the guards
in the duties, contribute to administration, and they generally serve as a
portmanteau variable for factors we cannot completely specify here.9
The payo¤s of the occupations of guard and praetorian are determined
by how much the peasants manage to keep. For given numbers of guards
and peasants, and self-protection level x by a peasant, the maximum share
8For some of the results in a previous version of this paper we allowed for f(Ng
Np
) where
 2 (0; 1] represents the proportion of guards that can be used for genuine protection, with
the rest of the guards being used towards the extraction of tribute from peasants. Because
our ndings do not change qualitatively with this added complication, we chose not to
include it in this version of the paper.
9Wintrobe (1998) species a detailed model of a monopolist-for-prot state in which,
in addition to repression, resource expenditures to increase the loyalty of subjects is ex-
amined.
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of output that could theoretically be retained by the peasant is p(x+ f(NgNp )).
However, as Leviathan has all the coercive machinery of guards and prae-
torians at his disposal, peasants can retain only whatever they can keep
from being snatched away from them. One possibility is that peasants can
keep away from Leviathan what they keep away from bandits, p(x): More
generally, however, we can suppose a resistance function (x) that indi-
cates the share of output a peasant can keep away from Leviathan and his
agents for any given level of self-protection x, where (x) 2 [0; 1]; (0) = 0;
and (1) = 1: Bandits take away [1  p(x+ f(NgNp ))](1  x) from each peas-
ant, Leviathan takes [p(x+ f(NgNp ))  (x)](1  x), and each peasant retains
(x)(1  x) of output. Each peasant chooses x to maximize (x)(1  x) and
we suppose a unique such choice x^. Therefore, the payo¤ of peasants as
well as that of bandits, guards, and praetorians is (x^)(1  x^).
When (x) < p(x) for all x, we can say that peasants resist Leviathan
less than they can resist bandits and, equivalently, Leviathan can extract
from peasants more easily than bandits can. As Leviathan is more organized
than individual bandits are we should perhaps expect this to be the more
likely condition. Under such conditions, it can be shown that (x^)(1  x^) <
p(x)(1 x):10 That is, when Leviathan is better at extraction than bandits,
the welfare of peasants under Leviathan would be lower than that under
anarchy. Although we will rst examine this case to understand some of its
e¤ects, for analytical convenience we will revert to the simpler case in which
(x) = p(x):
Since the numbers of peasants and bandits depend on the level of pro-
tection, which in part depends on the number of guards, Leviathan needs to
take account of the e¤ect his choice of Ng has on the number of peasants,
Np. If p(x^ + f(
Ng
Np
)) < 1 and therefore security is less than perfect, there
will be a positive number of bandits Nb = N   Ng   Np   Npr. With the
payo¤ of a bandit equalized to that of a peasant in this case, the number
of peasants that would emerge can be implicitly derived. When security
is perfect and there are no bandits, the number of peasants simply equals
N Ng Npr. Overall, for each choice of Ng there will be an induced number
of peasants which we denote by the function (Ng):11 Leviathans objective
is to maximize his net receipts by the choice of Ng, provided these receipts
are positive, while taking into account the e¤ect on the number of peasants
as described by (Ng) :
10Given that x maximizes p(x)(1   x), we have p(x)(1   x)  p(x^)(1   x^): Since
p(x) > (x) by the fact that Leviathan can extract more easily than bandits can, we
have p(x^)(1  x^) > (x^)(1  x^); thus yielding p(x)(1  x) > (x^)(1  x^):
11The details of the derivation of this function and its properties below are to be found
in the Supplementary Appendix.
11
VL = (Ng) [p(x^+ f(Ng=(Ng)))  (x^)] (1  x^)  (Ng +Npr)(x^)(1  x^)
(10)
The rst term in (10) represents Leviathans gross revenues (number of
peasants times tribute rate times output per peasant). The second term
represents the cost of hiring guards and praetorians.
We rst show by example what can occur when Leviathan can extract
tribute from peasants more easily than bandits can. Suppose p(x) = x,
(x) = x2 and f(z) = z
1
2 . Then under anarchy x = 12 , the payo¤of peasants
is 14 , half of the population are bandits and half peasants, and total output
is N4 . Under Leviathan, x^ =
2
3 , the payo¤ of peasants and those of the other
occupations is just 427 , but security is perfect and the number of peasants
is 0:9(N   Npr), higher than that under anarchy for most values of Npr
that yield a positive payo¤ for Leviathan. However, because peasants who
are under Leviathans heavy boot do not produce as much, total output is
3
10(N  Npr) which for Npr > 16N (but not too high, so Leviathan´s payo¤
is positive) is lower than total output under anarchy. Thus, contrary to
some of the arguments in McGuire and Olson (1996), Leviathan not only
may not improve output compared to anarchy but also may actually leave
a scorched earth of lower total output, as well as lower welfare for everyone
except Leviathan (or, possibly some of his entourage which could be easily
incorporated into the model). The key to this nding is a high extractive
capacity of Leviathan combined with an inability to commit against using
this capacity.
Having made this point, for convenience we will focus on the remain-
der on the simpler case in which Leviathan and bandits have exactly the
same extractive capacity ((x) = p(x) for all x). The following Proposition
summarizes our ndings with (part (i)) and without (part (ii)) the higher
extractive capacity by Leviathan.12
Proposition 2: (i) If Leviathan can extract from peasants more eas-
ily than bandits can (i.e., (x) < p(x) for all x), then total output under
Leviathan´ s rule can be lower than total output under anarchy.
(ii) Suppose Leviathan and bandits can extract equally well from peasants
(i.e., (x) = p(x) for all x). Further, suppose p() is concave and f()
satises (5). If the xed number of praetorians, Npr, is su¢ ciently low,
there is a choice of guards that maximizes Leviathans payo¤ at a positive
level. Such a choice has the following properties: (a) Total output under
12 It can be shown that when Leviathan cannot extract as easily as bandits can (i.e.,
(x) > p(x)) is the only case in which peasants would be better o¤ under Leviathan than
under anarchy. Grossman (1998) also nds conditions that lead to a similar nding (it
occurs when bandits can take a lot from peasants). For our case, we cannot think of
circumstances that would lead bandits to be better at extraction than Leviathan.
12
Leviathan is higher than total output under anarchy; (b) Total output under
Leviathan may be higher or lower than total output under self-governance;
the lower Npr is and the higher k is , the higher the ratio of the two outputs
is and, therefore, the more likely that output is higher under Leviathan.
(For the proof of part (ii), please see the proof of Proposition 3 in the 1997
working paper version.)
When Leviathan is not better than bandits in extracting tribute from
peasants, total output is higher then under anarchy (iia) but does not have
to be higher than that under self-governance, despite the latters free-rider
problem. The cost of taxation as manifested in the high self-protection levels
of the peasants, along with a high xed cost and small minimum size for
the collective protection technology, can make output under self-governance
higher.
Large prots typically attract competitors. With Leviathan appropri-
ating all the extra income, we can expect competitors who would vie for a
portion of prots.
IV.B Competing Lords
Instead of having a single Leviathan and small-time challengers contest-
ing his rule, we will now examine the case in which all individuals ex ante
are potential little Leviathans or lords; they can choose this occupation just
as they would chose to be peasant, bandit, praetorian, or guard. A lords
job is similar to that of Leviathan in the hiring of praetorians and guards
and in receiving tribute from peasants. We continue to maintain the same
assumptions about the technology of collective protection and about the
sharing of the surplus between lord and peasant. For simplicity, we continue
to suppose that (x) = p(x) so that a peasant contributes x to his private
protection and his payo¤ equals p(x)(1  x).
The lord, though, has a major headache that Leviathan did not have.
Other lords are now after tribute received from peasants, and he needs to
defend that tribute against them. He can do that by hiring warriors to keep
the other lords outside his territory (and keep the sequestered peasants in)
and possibly gain additional territory at their expense. But then the other
lords will respond in kind. Thus the new element in the lords competing
against one another is that they will have to hire warriors as well.
In this setting peasants have limited options. They are tied to their
land and at the mercy of the lords who compete over how to divide them
up.13 This is a rather di¤erent type of competition than the one typically
assumed by economists, whereby di¤erent jurisdictions attempt to attract
13 In alternative interpretations, the peasants could conceivably decide to go it alone,
but they would then receive the same payo¤ as under a lord. They could also go "into the
woods" where they would receive a payo¤ that may be higher or lower that the prevailing
payo¤ under a lord; e¤ectively we are assuming that such payo¤ is not higher than that
under a lord. The peasants might also try to join a self-governing state, a possibility that
13
mobile subjects through lower taxation or other privileges. Whereas this
type of competition takes place in much of the world today and some eco-
nomic historians (e.g., North and Thomas, 1973) have argued for its im-
portance in the rise of the West, this is hardly the most widespread form of
competition that has existed in the past or the only form of competition that
is taking place today. From Mesopotamia to China, Egypt, Mesoamerica,
or feudal Europe, serfs were tied to the land and free peasants typically had
no outside options, with rulers coming and going but without any change
in their incentives for production. Even in the past two centuries, with the
rise of the rights of man, the most liberal of states have sequestered their
citizens with barbed-wire borders and passport controls. While we do not
deny the importance of tax-and-privilege competition of mobile subjects, we
nd the complete lack of study of this other signicant form of competition
based on the use of force as providing ample reasons for a rst look.
Let nwl denote the number of warriors hired by lord l. For a given
number of lords Nl and peasants Np, the number of peasants that lord l can
sequester, and receive tribute from, is given by
q(nwl; nw l)Np (11)
where nw l = (nwl; :::; nwl 1; nwl+2; :::; nwNL) is the vector of warriors hired
by the other lords. Also, q() satises the following properties:
q()2 [0; 1] is a symmetric, twice di¤erentiable function which is increasing
in its rst argument and decreasing in the remainder NL   1 arguments
with
PNl
j=1
q(nwj ; nw j) = 1
Letting npr be the xed number of praetorians and ngl the number of
guards hired by lord l, the payo¤ of the lord can now be written:
Vl = q(nwl; nw l)Np (12)
[p(x + f(ngl=(q(nwl; nw l)Np)))  p(x)] (1  x) 
(nwl + ngl + npr)p(x
)(1  x)
The main di¤erence of (12) from Leviathans payo¤ in (10) is the deter-
mination of the number of peasants: Whereas in (10) the chosen number
of guards induces the number of peasants through (), here the number of
peasants is determined by the number of warriors the particular lord has
relative to other lords.
Initially, suppose the number of lords is given at Nl > 1. Then, a short-
run lordship regime consists of numbers of peasants Np, bandits Nb, and
for each lord l guards ngl and warriors nwl such that:
we will allow in the next section (where we can only nd conditions that lead to an even
lower payo¤ than under a lord or under anarchy).
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(I) Each lord l = 1; 2; :::; Nl takes Np as given and chooses ngl and nwl
simultaneously with other lords so that these choices form a Nash equilib-
rium;
(II) Nb =
NlP
j=1
nbj where for all j nbj = q(nwj ; nw j)Np(1  pj)=p(x)
and pj  p(x + f(ngj=(q(nwj ; nw j)Np)))
(III) N =
NlP
j=1
ngj +
NlP
j=1
nwj + Nlnpr +Np + Nl +Nb
Part (I) is straightforward: The lords compete for market sharethrough
hiring of warriors and the protection they provide to peasants, although each
lord individually does not take account of his own e¤ect on the number of
peasants. Part (II) states that the number of bandits equals the sum of the
bandits in each lord´s territory, and the number of bandits in each lord´s
territory is such that the utility of bandits and peasants is equalized. Clearly,
the number of bandits in territory j is inversely related to the total protec-
tion level pj and when there is perfect security (pj = 1) there are no bandits
in territory j. Finally, part (III) is a market clearingcondition, so that
the Nash equilibrium choices of warriors and guards, the induced numbers
of peasants and bandits, and the xed numbers of praetorians and lords add
up to the total population N .
The problem of existence of such a regime, although analogous to the
problem of existence of competitive equilibrium in neoclassical economics, is
nontrivial. The proposition that follows provides information on existence,
uniqueness, and characterization of the short-run lordship regime.
Proposition 3: Suppose q() is concave in its rst argument, p() is
concave, and f() satises (5).
(i) Then, each lord´ s payo¤, Vl, is concave in ngl and nwl and for any
given Np a Nash equilibrium in ngl and nwl exists.
(ii) If the Nash equilibrium nwls and ngls are continuous functions of
Np on the interval

0; N   N1(1 + npr)

, then a short-run lordship regime
exists.
(iii) Under any short-run lordship regime, each lord provides the same
level of protection.
(iv) If the following condition is satised
q(nwl; nw l) = h(nwl)=
Nl
[
X
j=1
h(nwj)] (13)
where h() is a positive, increasing, and concave function a short-run lord-
ship regime is unique in the number of lords and symmetric, whereby every
lord chooses the same number of guards and warriors. In such regimes, (a)
the number of peasants is strictly decreasing in the number of lords and (b)
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each lords payo¤ is strictly decreasing in the number of lords. (the proof is
in the Appendix.)
The su¢ cient condition for existence in part (ii) is analogous to the con-
tinuity of demand functions in the theory of competitive equilibrium. The
properties of the short-run lordship regime in parts (iv), (a) and (b) are in-
tuitively plausible. When an additional lord enters the fray, each lord would
increase his number of warriors for a given number of peasants. Since the
number of peasants is endogenous, however, their number should decrease in
equilibrium with the total number of warriors increasing. A smaller number
of peasants shared among a larger number of lords is eventually shown to
also yield a smaller payo¤ for lords.
Additional properties would require employing specic functional forms.
For example, consider the following special case of (13):14
q(nw1;nw 1) = nw1m=(
NlX
j=1
nwj
m) where 1  m > 0
The parameter m is a measure of how easy it is for a lord to increase
his dominion when he increases the number of warriors he hires by a small
amount, the e¤ectiveness of conict. Then, under examples for other func-
tions we employed earlier,15 as the technology of conict becomes more
e¤ective (m increases), the total number of peasants becomes smaller. It
appears that this occurs because lords compete more intensely when con-
ict becomes more e¤ective by hiring additional warriors, without however
changing their share of peasants. The e¤ect of this additional demand for
manpower is to decrease the population pool from which the peasants are
drawn. The end result of an increase in m is a smaller number of peasants,
a larger number of warriors per lord, and a smaller number of guards per
lord. Such an increase in m also reduces each lords prots.
In the long-run lords should be allowed to exit and potential lords should
be allowed to enter and establish their own state. Since lords come from
the population, N , we suppose the long-run number of lords is determined
by the reservation payo¤ in this economy, which is the peasants payo¤
Up (= p(x)(1 x)). There will be no incentive for lords to exit and potential
lords to enter as long as the existing lords earn a payo¤ that is at least as
high as that of peasants, and if an extra lord were to enter he would receive
a lower payo¤ than that of peasants. Let V Nll denote an (equilibrium) payo¤
14Hirshleifer (1989) has examined the properties of this functional form; Skaperdas
(1996) has axiomatized it as well as the more general form in (13).
15That is, under p(x) = x and the technology of collective protection is f(z) = z
( 2 (0; 1)) the total number of peasants equals
N 0p =
2
1
 Nl[N  Nl(1+npr)]
Nl(1+2
1
 )+( Nl 1)2
1
m(1 )
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of lord l = 1; 2; :::; Nl under a short-run lordship regime with Nl lords. We
then dene a long-run lordship regime to be a short-run lordship regime
(that satises (I)  (III)) and a number of lords N 0l such that
(IV ) V
N
0
l
l  Up for all l = 1; 2; :::; N
0
l and
V
N 0l+1
l < U

p for at least one l = 1; 2; :::; N
0
l ; N
0
l + 1:
Proposition 4: Suppose q() is concave in its rst argument and satises
(13), p() is concave, and f() satises (5). Furthermore, suppose that if
only one lord were to exist, he would receive a higher payo¤ than a peasant.
Then, (i) a unique (in the number of lords) and symmetric long-run lordship
regime exists; (ii) the number of peasants and the output of such a long-
run lordship regime approximates from above, respectively, the number of
peasants and the output under anarchy; in particular:
N
0
p = N

p +N
0
l (V
N
0
l
l   Up ) (14)
Part (ii) of the Proposition states that output and the number of peas-
ants is almost the same as those under anarchy. Free entry of lords essen-
tially eliminates all the extra production that can be achieved by the use of
the collective protection technology. What was previously taken by bandits
under anarchy is now taken by praetorians, warriors, guards, lords, and,
possibly, by bandits as well, without essentially a¤ecting the total output
that is produced. (If of course lords can extract more e¢ ciently than bandits
can, output could be even lower than anarchy.) Literal anarchy is replaced
by a more organized, higher-level anarchy of predatory states.
V. Why Self-Governance is Di¢ cult
We now show how self-governing states can not in general coexist in the
presence of predatory states that are run by lords, even when there is no free-
rider problem in providing for defense against other states. We rst dene
an appropriate notion of short-run equilibrium that allows for both lords and
self-governing states to coexist. We then show that, under the examples we
have used in various parts of the paper, the equilibrium payo¤ of peasants
belonging to a self-governing state would always fall short of the payo¤ a
peasant could receive in anarchy or under a lord (when p(x) = (x)). Thus,
it would not be protable for such a state to form and a long-run equilibrium
with self-governing states would not exist.
Suppose there are Nl > 1 lords and a number of S  1 of self-governing
states with k peasants each. The lords behave as in the previous section
and their payo¤ functions are as in (12) (except for the slight modication
of q() below, which has to take account of the warriors of self-governing
states). Peasants in self-governing states, in addition to contributing to
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private and collective protection need to contribute to ghting for their
independence by spending some of their time as warriors. Let ws denote the
total resources spent on ghting (external enemies) by self-governing state
s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg. We suppose that each citizen-peasant contributes an equal
portion ws=k to ghting; contributions to private and collective protection
are as before voluntary. (Clearly, if contributions to ghting external enemies
were voluntary, the viability of a self-governing state would be even more
problematic.) Thus the payo¤ of a peasant-citizen is:
Upi = p(xi + f(z))(1  xi   zi   ws=k) [z =
kX
j=1
zj=k] (1)
To maintain their independence, the citizens of state s 2 f1; 2; :::; Sg
have to expend e¤ort on war, ws, so that
q(ws; w s; nw)Np = k (15)
where w s is the vector of war e¤orts by all the other self-governing
states, nw is the vector of warriors of all the lordships, and q() is the con-
test success function dened in (11) and appropriately modied to include
the war e¤ort of the self-governing states. We are now ready to dene an
appropriate notion of equilibrium for these states, which is an extension of
the short-run lordship regime dened in the previous section.
A short-run integrated equilibrium consists of numbers of peasants N
0
p;
bandits N
0
b; for each lord l guards n
0
gl and warriors n
0
wl; for each self-
governing state s a war e¤ort w
0
s; and for each citizen-peasant in self-
governing states choices of private and collective protection such that:
(Ia) Each lord l = 1; 2; :::; Nl takes N
0
pand the w
0
ss as given, and chooses
n0gl and n
0
wl simultaneously with other lords so that these choices form a
Nash equilibrium.;
(Ib) Each self-governing state s = 1; 2; :::; S chooses w
0
s so that (15) is
satised;
(Ic) Each citizen-peasant takes w
0
s as given and chooses private and
collective protection levels so that they form a Nash equilibrium;
(II)N
0
b =
NlP
j=1
n
0
bj+
SP
s=1
nbs where for all j n
0
bj = qjN
0
p(1 pj)=p(x);
for all s nbs = kps=p(x); and pjand ps are the shares of output kept away
from bandits in lordship j and self-governing state s;
(III) N =
NlP
j=1
n
0
gj +
NlP
j=1
n
0
wj +
Nlnpr +N
0
p +
Nl +N
0
b + Sk
We will now derive the integrated equilibrium under the following func-
tional forms: p(x) = x; f(z) = z1=2, and the modication of (13) where the
share of peasants of lordship j is qj = nwl=(
NlP
j=1
nwj +
SP
s=1
ws).
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It can be shown that lords choose to provide perfect security and all
choose the same number of guards n
0
gl = (N
0
p   Sk)=4 Nl. Lords also choose
the same equilibrium number of warrior n
0
wl = (N
0
p Sk)( Nl 1)= N2l . All the
self-governing states choose war e¤ort w
0
= k( Nl 1)= Nl. In turn, all citizen-
peasants choose contributions to collective production of z
0
= 1=4k2 and
private protection of x
0
= 1=2 Nl   (2k   1)=8k2. The equilibrium payo¤ of
citizen-peasants can be found by substituting w
0
=k, x
0
, and z in (1"), and
equals
U
0
p = 1=4 N
2
l   (2k   1)2=64k4: (16)
We are interested in comparing this equilibrium citizen-peasant payo¤
to that of a peasant under a lord, which (since p(x) = (x)) also equals
the peasants payo¤ under anarchy, p(x)(1   x). Under the example we
are examining this payo¤ is 1=4, which we need to compare to U
0
p in (16).
Straightforward algebra shows that U
0
p < 1=4 holds for all Nl > 1 and for
all k. Thus a citizen-peasants payo¤ under a short-run integrated equilib-
rium is always lower than the payo¤ of a peasant under a lord or under
anarchy. Consequently, there would be no incentive to form a self-governing
state under such circumstances and thus self-governance could not be viable
in the long-run.We summarize the nding of this section in the form of a
Proposition.
Proposition 5: Consider the short-run integrated equilibrium under the
following functional forms: p(x) = (x) = x; f(z) = z1=2, and the share of
peasants of lordship j is qj = nwl=(
NlP
j=1
nwj +
SP
s=1
ws):Then, the equilibrium
payo¤ of every peasant in a self-governing state is lower than under a lord
or under anarchy.
The burden of defense against other states, imposes such a cost on the
individual citizen-peasants so that there are not many resources left for
internal protection against bandits and for production.
We should emphasize that we do not completely rule out the possibility
of self-governing states being able to survive under some set of functional
forms that would allow this to occur. We consider then our counterexample
to the coexistence of self-governance and lordships and our inability to nd
any examples in which this can occur as strong theoretical evidence for
the di¢ culty of self-governance surviving in the presence of predators. Of
course, discovering conditions in other models that would yield the viability
of self-governance is an important topic for future research.
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VI. Concluding Comments
We have examined the provision of protection within a simple and stark
context. The framework we have employed has allowed us to make inferences
both about the internal organization of the states that could emerge and
about their market structure. While self-governance yields higher welfare for
predator and prey alike, the small size of self-governing states along with the
coercive machinery that can be employed by predatory states make the long-
run viability of self-governance problematic. Hence hierarchy and predatory
behavior towards subjects is the more stable form of internal organization;
and competition among such states for the rents thus created is the dominant
market structure. But, contrary to ordinary economic markets, the more
competition there is in the market for protection, the worse it is - competing
lords and their entourages extract what would have been taken in their
absence by simple bandits.
A possibly helpful analogy is to think of the state as an onion, albeit
with layers that have di¤erent character and color. Layers of autocratic and
coercive habits lie below others with more democratic conventions, consti-
tutions, legal codes, ideologies, or norms that govern interactions in most of
todays states. Once in a while, something occurs and pierces the modern
layers leading to the previous ones that lay dormant. Outbreaks of violence,
coercion, and horrors can ensue. Our purpose in this paper has been to
improve understanding of what lies in these deeper layers, in the subcor-
tex of the States brain. In much of economics these outer layers of the
state have been taken for granted, a practice that in the somewhat tranquil
post-World War II period may have been harmless and typically useful for
understanding economic behavior in industrialized countries. But the inner
layers of the state have always been making their ugly presence felt in much
of the developing world and more recently have systematically confronted
transition economies. Ignoring the fundamental problem in providing secu-
rity and protection, and treating systematic deviations from ideal notions of
the state as aberrations would not appear to be a fruitful attitude. Looking
into the inner layers of the state is a comparatively easy task, because of
their starkness and relative simplicity. Understanding how the outer lay-
ers of the modern state, including representative democracy, have appeared
among seas of coercive governance appears to be a more di¢ cult task.
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APPENDIX
We will employ Claim 1 in the proof of part (i) of Proposition 3.
Claim 1: A(z)  p (x + f (z))   p (x)   p(x + f (z)) f 0 (z) z > 0 for
all z 2 [0; 1] when p () is concave and f () is strictly concave.
Proof: Since p (0) = 0 and p () is concave we have [p (x + f (z))  p (x)] =f (z) 
p0 (x + f (z)) : Therefore, substitution yields:
A(z)  p0 (x + f (z)) f (z)  f 0 (z) z
Since f (0) = 0 and f () is strictly concave we also have f (z) > f 0 (z) z.
Hence the term inside the brackets in the right-hand-side of the inequality is
positive which, together with the positivity of p0 (x + f (z)), implies A (z) >
0. 
Proof of Proposition 3: Part (i): For compactness, let
ql = q (nwl; nw l) ; p = p (x + f (ngl= (q (nwl; nw l)Np))) ; and
f = f (ngl= (q (nwl; nw l)Np)) : Then, Vl in (12) is as follows:
Vl = q
lNp [p  p (x)] (1  x)  (nwl + ngl + npr) p (x) (1  x) ((12))
To show the concavity of Vl in nwl and ngl; we will show that the Hessian
of Vl (w.r.t. those two variables) is negative denite. Letting ql1 and q
l
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denote the rst and second partial derivatives of ql with respect to its rst
argument (nwl), successive di¤erentiation of Vl yields:
@Vl=@nwl = (1  x)
n
ql1=q
l
 h
qlNp (p  p (x))  p0f 0ngl
i
  p (x)
o
@Vl=@ngl = (1  x)
 
p0f 0   p (x)
@2Vl=@n
2
wl = (1  x)
(  
ql11q
lNp=q
l
 
(p  p (x))  p0f 0  ngl=qlNp+
+
 
ql1
2
Np
h
p00 (f 0)2 + p0f 00
i 
ngl=
 
q1Np
2 )
= (1  x)

ql11q
lNp=q
l

A+

ql1
2
Np
h
ngl=

qlNp
i2
B

(A1)
where
A  (p  p (x))  p0f 0

ngl=q
lNp

and
C  p00  f 02 + p0f 00,
@2Vl=@n
2
wl = (1  x)C=

qlNp

and
@2Vl= (@nwl@ngl) =  Cql1Np
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Note thatA is the same asA(z), dened in Claim 1, with z = ngl=
 
qlNp

:
By Claim 1, then, A is positive. Since p () is concave and f () is strictly
concave, C, as dened above, is negative. Finally, since q is concave in
its rst argument, ql11 is non-positive. Altogether, those properties readily
imply the negativity of both @2Vl=@n2wl and @
2Vl=@n
2
gl: Consequently, the
determinants of the rst principal minors of the Hessian of Vl are negative,
as is necessary for the concavity of Vl.
The determinant of the Hessian itself is H =

@2Vl=@n
2
wl

[@2Vl=@n
2
gl]  
@2Vl= (@nwl@ngl)
2 which, given the calculations above, can be shown to
equal (1  x) ql11AB=ql: Given that ql11 < 0: A > 0; and C < 0; that
determinant is positive. It follows that the Hessian of Vl is negative denite
and, therefore, Vl is concave in nwl and ngl. Then, for the given number of
lords, N l, and a number of peasants Np; a Nash equilibrium exists.
Part (ii): Let gl (Np) and wl (Np) denote the continuous functions men-
tioned in the if part of (ii)s statement. Then, note that the induced
number of bandits for any given Np, and assuming the lords play Nash equi-
librium strategies that induce gl (Np) guards and wl (Np) warriors for lord
l, is a function B (Np) =
N lP
l=1
bl (Np) where bl (Np) is the induced number of
peasants in lord ls territory. Because bl (Np) is a continuous function of
the numbers of guards and warriors (compare with part II of denition of
short-run lordship regime), B (Np) is a continuous function as well.
Thus far, we have shown that, for a given Np, the induced guards gl (Np),
warriors wl (Np) for l = 1; :::; N l, and the induced number of bandits, B (Np),
satisfy parts I and II of the denition of the short-run lordship regime. To
show the existence of that regime, then, amounts to showing the existence
of an N
0
p that induces numbers of guards, warriors, and bandits that satisfy
the following version of part III of the regimes denition:

N  N l (1 + npr)

=
N lX
l=1
gl

N
0
p

+
N lX
l=1
wl

N
0
p

+N
0
p +B

N
0
p

or, that the function H (Np) 
N lP
l=1
gl (Np) +
N lP
l=1
wl (Np) +Np +B (Np) has a
point in its domain, N
0
p, such thatH

N
0
p

=

N  N l (1 + npr)

: Now, note
that for Np = 0 it is optimal for every lord to choose no guards or warriors
and thus have gl (0) = wl (0) = 0: Similarly, since without any peasants
around being a bandit provides zero payo¤, we must have B (Np) = 0: Hence,
we have H (0) = 0: Next, note that, since the numbers of guards, warriors,
or bandits cannot be negative H
 
N  N l (1 + npr)
  N   N l (1 + npr) :
These two properties along with the continuity of H () imply the existence
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of the N
0
p we were looking for, with n
0
wl = wl

N
0
p

; n
0
gl = gl

N
0
p

; and
N
0
b = B

N
0
p

:
Part (iii): Consider a short-run lordship regime. The same level of pro-
tection would be provided by each lord if p
h
x + f

n0gl=
 
qlN 0p
i
were to
be identical for all l = 1; :::; N l or, given the costliness of guards and war-
riors, if zl  n0gl=
 
qlN 0p

were also to be identical across lords. First note
that @Vl=@ngl evaluated at ngl = 0 equals (1  x) (p0 (x) f 0(0)  p(x)) =
(1  x) (p0 (x) f 0(0)  p(x)(1  x)) = (1  x) p0 (x) (f 0(0)  (1  x)) which
is positive since the concavity of f 0 () along with f (0) = 0 imply f 0(0) 
1 > 1  x: In turn, this property implies that n0gl is always positive for all
l. Therefore at the lordship regime values, we must have either
@Vl=@ng = (1  x)
h
p0x + f(zl))f 0(zl)  p(x)
i
= 0;
or p
 
x + f(zl)

= 1 (where in the latter case @Vl=@ng evaluated at zl would
be positive). The solution in terms of zl, because f () is strictly concave
and p () concave, is in either case unique and identical across the di¤erent
lords. Therefore, each lord provides the same level of protection.
Part (iv): We rst show symmetry and then uniqueness. Consider
any short-run lordship regime and let    over a variable denote the
value of the variable under the regime. From part (iii) we know that
zl  n0gl=
 
qlN 0p

and p
 
x + f(zl

) take the same values for all lords. There-
fore, A  p  x + f(zl)   p(x)   p0  x + f(zl)f 0(zl)zl is identical across
the di¤erent lords. Then, we can write:
@Vl=@nwl = (1  x)
h
ql1NpA  p(x)
i
Note that these derivatives can be di¤erent across lords (and, for the same
lord, across di¤erent points) only by the value of ql1 = @q (nwl;nw l) =@nwl:
By the contest success function in (13), it can be shown that
ql1 = h
0 (nwl)
24X
i6=l
h (nwi)
35 ="X
all i
h (nwi)
#2
(A2)
Consider any two lords j and k and suppose, contrary to what we want to
show, that n0wj > n
0
wk ( 0): Then, by the concavity of the payo¤ functions,
the relationship between these two lordspartial derivatives, each evaluated
at the lords regime point, must be at follows:
@Vk=@nwk  @Vj=@nwj = 0
In turn, from the above this relationship implies qkl  qjl or, given (A2),
23
h0
 
n0wk
24X
i6=k
h
 
n0wi
35 ="X
all i
h
 
n0wi
#2  h0  n0wj
24X
i6=k
h
 
n0wi
35 ="X
all i
h
 
n0wi
#2
Since the denominators of the two expressions are identical, we also
have
h0
 
n0wk
24X
i6=k
h
 
n0wi
35  h0  n0wj
24X
i6=k
h
 
n0wi
35 (A3)
Since, by supposition, n0wj > n
0
wk we have
P
i6=k
h (n0wi) >
P
i6=k
h (n0wi) and,
by the concavity of h (), h0 (n0wk)  h0

n0wj

: These two inequalities, taken
together, contradict (A3). Therefore, our original supposition n0wj > n
0
wk is
false. By a similar argument we can show that n0wj < n
0
wk cannot be true
either. Hence, we must have n0wj = n
0
wk for any two lords j and k. This
property, in turn, implies that qjNp = qkNp and, given that zj = zk, we also
have n0gj = n
0
gk. This establishes that any lordship regime is symmetric.
To show uniqueness, let n0w and n2w denote the choices of warriors asso-
ciated with two di¤erent regimes and w.l.o.g. suppose n2w > n
0
w( 0): Then,
the following relationships would hold between the pairs of derivatives:
@V 0l =@nwl  @V 2l =@nwl = 0
=) ql01  ql21
=) h0(n0w)=h(n0w)  h0(n2w)=h(n2w)
But the concavity of h () along with n2w > n0w contradict this last inequality.
Therefore our initial supposition of two di¤erent short-run lordship regimes
must be false; there is only one symmetric regime.
Part (iv), (a): We have just shown that a unique and symmetric short-
run lordship regime exists for any given number of lords. The number of
peasants in such a short-run lordship regime is:
Np = N  Nb  Nl(1 + npr + nw + ng); (A4)
where all variables are assumed to be at the regime values. From the
proof of part (iii), it can be shown that, regardless of Nl;
ng = (Np=Nl) for some  > 0: (A5)
That property also implies that the same level of protection is provided
across di¤erent regimes, that p  p(x + f(z)) does not vary across regimes
(and depends only on the technologies of private and collective protection).
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In turn, that property along with condition (II) implies that the number of
bandits is related to the number of peasants as follows:
Nb = [(1  p)=p(x)] =Np: (A6)
Using (A5) and (A6), we can eliminate ng and Nb from (A4), which after
re-arranging can be written as:
ENp+Nl(1+npr+nw) = N where E  [1  p+ p(x)(1 + )] =p(x) (A4)
If nw were 0, an increase in the number of lords, Nl; would clearly lead to a
reduction in the number of peasants, Np: Thus, for the rest of this proof we
assume an interior (Nash equilibrium) choice of guards (nw > 0): Then, the
rst-order condition of the symmetric equilibrium under (13) implies:
h0(nw)=h(nw) N2l d= [Np(Nl   1)] = 0 where d  1 p+p(x)(1+) (A7)
Np and nw are simultaneously determined through (A4) and (A6) and a
change in the number of lords also changes the values of these variables.
Although we dene lordship regimes for integer values of Nl; (A4) and (A6)
are dened for real values of Nl: Moreover these functions are di¤erentiable
in Nl; as well as Np and nw; and the conditions for an implicit function
theorem are satised. The marginal e¤ect of Nl on Np can then be shown
to be:
@Np=@Nl = (1=D)
 (1 + npr + nw)HNp(Nl   1) + dN2l (Nl   2)=(Nl   1)
(A8)
where
D = (d=p(x))HNp(Nl   1) Nl(Nl   1)dh0(nw)=h(nw)
which is negative since
H = h00(nw)=h(nw) 

h0(nw)=h(nw)
2  0
(it is the second derivative of the rst argument of q(() which, by assump-
tion, is concave). Since H is non-positive the term of @Np=@Nl inside the
brackets is positive and, since D is negative, the e¤ect of an increase in the
number of lords on the number of peasants must be negative.
Part (iv), (b): Next we seek to show that each lords payo¤ is strictly
decreasing in the number of lords. Note that in the symmetric regime the
payo¤ of each lord is as follows:
Vl = [Total output  (Np +Nb +Nw +Ng +Npr)p(x)(1  x)] =Nl
= [Np(1  x)  (N  Nl)p(x)(1  x)] =Nl
= (1  x)(Np + p(x)Nl   p(x)N)=Nl
= p(x)(1  x) + (Np  Np )=Nl
(A9)
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Since p(x)(1   x) and Np are constant and we have just shown that Np
depends negatively on Nl; Vl must also be strictly decreasing on Nl:
Proof of Proposition 4: Part (i): By the assumptions stated in the
Proposition, which are the same as those of Proposition 3, part (iv), a
short-run lordship regime exists for any number of lords, which is unique
and symmetric - in particular all lords receive the same payo¤. Moreover,
by part (iv) (b) of Proposition 3, the lordspayo¤ is strictly decreasing in
the number of lords. For su¢ ciently small npr and with V l(Nl = 1)  Up ;
there is a number of lords that yields a lords payo¤ higher than that of a
peasant (which equals Up ). In addition, we can always nd a large enough
number of lords (say, N) that yields a payo¤ to a lord that is lower than Up .
Then, since the lordspayo¤ is strictly decreasing in the number of lords,
there must exist a unique number of lords, N 0p, that satises condition (IV ).
Therefore, a unique long-run lordship regime exists.
Part (ii): Total output is proportional to the number of peasants (it
equals Np(1  x)), so we only need consider the number of peasants. From
(A9), we have V
N 0l
l   Up = (N 0p   Np )=N 0l : Solving for N 0p in terms of the
other variables yields equation (14) in the main text. Since the payo¤ of
lords is strictly decreasing in the number of lords and, by the denition of
a long-run lordship regime, V
N 0l
l   Up should be typically rather small, the
number of peasants approximates from above the number of peasants under
anarchy.
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